Part 1 Introduction
The revolution in military affairs is here, now, today. Warfare is changing at a pace equal to the technological advances of our country and the world. Information superiority has never been more highly emphasized as a defining factor upon which victory or defeat can be measured. The A crucial component of Joint Vision 2010 is the importance of information superiority-the ability to collect, process, and disseminate an uninterrupted flow of information while denying the enemy's ability to do the same. UAVs are likely to be crucial in achieving information superiority, particularly because they can collect information that in the past would have been difficult to acquire without risking the lives of personnel. 1 For those involved in the operational art of warfare, harnessing the tools of technology is a requirement for mission success. The focus on Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) as a supporting element or even a replacement to tactical aircraft is under consideration for many mission tasks. That is not to say that the airman will no longer be required. UAV development is not close to that level of perfection in many mission areas. However, UAVs can significantly diminished the personal risk to aviators accomplishing dangerous missions. Further, in many cases the cost savings, low human risk factors, and endurance benefits of medium and high altitude UAVs make them the platform of choice for missions such as; strategic intelligence gathering, communications relays, location and jamming of enemy radar, peacekeeping monitor, or Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR). Weaponization of UAVs will add a whole host of new mission roles. Nine critical operational missions outlined by the United States Air Force Scientific Advisory Boards report on UAV Technologies and Combat Operations published in 1996, emphasize the expansion of UAV capabilities in the near term.
• The Department of Defense is currently pursuing three medium/high altitude and endurance UAV systems: Predator, Global Hawk, and Outrider. The Navy has just announced plans to develop a fourth Multi-Role UAV (MR-UAV) intended to for SEAD and ISR missions. 2 Current Department of Defense planners expect near term UAV missions to center on broad categories of reconnaissance and surveillance. These missions typically fall into either strategic or tactical categories. Strategic intelligence is usually long ranged in nature. Gathered by satellite assets or U-2 aircraft, strategic reconnaissance improves the United States capacity to see what military assets, concentration of forces, weapons of mass destruction and industrial and manufacturing facilities another country possesses. UAVs such as Global Hawk will be primarily tasked for this role as an augmentation to or replacement of aging U-2 aircraft and will be considered a theater asset in terms of who gets to use Global Hawk's exceptional sensors. 3 Tactical intelligence is local in nature. The battlefield commander wants real time feedback on troop dispositions and strengths just over the next hill. Helicopter or other aerial reconnaissance assets may not be as timely in reporting information to the tactical level commander. 4 New UAVs such as Outrider will be primarily used in this method. Older (relative term) UAVs such as Pioneer and Predator are currently fulfilling this role to a limited degree.
"Those programs, if ultimately successful, promise to give the battlefield commanders a valuable new reconnaissance capability as well as to enhance and perhaps eventually replace many sophisticated manned reconnaissance systems that provide intelligence to theater commanders and the national command authority".
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The focus of this research is to support new concepts of operation (CONOPS) with respect to using UAVs in the battle against narcotics trafficking that undermine the safety, security, and vitality of the United States. Specifically, how the medium altitude-endurance UAV "Predator"
could function in support of the U.S. Navy, U.S. Coast Guard, and U.S. Customs agencies in a maritime environment to reduce the flow of illegal narcotics into the United States. This concept of operations has strategic elements that are outlined in the National Security Strategy of the United States under vital interests. Any threat to the security, safety and vitality of the nation is considered a vital interest. 6 The National Command authority has supported using the military to augment counter narcotics operations by the U.S. Coast Guard and U.S. Customs officials for many years. Navy Warships and aircraft have been routinely deployed to aid in this effort. How these assets are used and the opportunity cost of their employment in this role must be weighed against the requirements of the fleet around the world. The recent reduction in force levels places an everincreasing burden each asset. 
Automated
A crewless aircraft has technical aspects that allow designers to save money while maintaining capability. The cost of training mission personnel is much lower than the manned alternative. Crew safety testing and life support systems are not required. Using automated UAVs significantly reduces fatigue on ground crews and completely removes other flight physiology related stresses. These factors combine to reduce the cost of coverage, which is always a primary consideration in platform selection versus mission roles.
High Altitude Operation
Current missions typically associated with UAVs use altitude as the primary enabler.
Higher altitude allows for broader areas of coverage with multiple sensors. Sensors employing doppler radar achieve better viewing angles with increased altitude for better resolution. Aircraft performance is also enhanced. Fuel consumption is reduced which directly equates to greater 7 range and endurance. Further, UAVs at altitude enjoy relative survivability. Out of the range of most ground fire, they can operate with impunity. A certain level of visual and audio covertness is inherent. Unaided human ears for example, can not generally hear engine noise on the Predator if the UAV is above 10,000ft. In terms of future concepts, UAVs employed as Theater Ballistic Missile Defense platforms have a more advantageous geometry for intercept with high altitude capability.
Part 3 UAV DEVELOPMENTS
As early as World War I, the concept of using Unmanned Aerial vehicles existed. One of the early airpower theorists General Billy Mitchell said in 1924, "Aerial torpedoes which are really airplanes kept on their course by gyroscopic instruments an wireless telegraphy, with no pilots on board, can be directed for over a hundred miles in a sufficiently accurate way to hit great cities. So that in the future, the mere threat of bombing a town by an air force will cause cities to be evacuated, and all the munitions and supply factories to be stopped." Although history has not supported that claim, the importance of a UAV concept was clear.
The UAV known as the Firebee, later designated BQM-34 was a standard jet target used in a multi-role fashion by the Air Force, Navy, and Canadian Forces. 1 This versatile drone was a baseline for UAV evolution. In the 1950s intelligence gathering missions against the Soviet Union used the BQM-34. The Firebees' replacement, the Ryan 147B was the first UAV specifically designed for operational intelligence collection against Cuba and Vietnam. 
History of Predator
The Advanced Concept Technology Demonstration (ACTD) process on the Predator was begun in 1993. The first air vehicle and ground station was delivered, and flown in 1994.
Delivery of ten Predator UAVs and three ground stations was completed in March 1995 with subsequent deployment to Bosnia in August. During this time the Predator flew over 130 missions totaling 850 flight hours. By June 1996, further airframe and payload upgrades were implemented and the ACTD was considered complete. Predator was approved to enter the production phase of the acquisition process in August 1997. "The Air Force plans to Buy a total of 12 systems (each with four air vehicles and one ground control station) and to deploy only five of them to a regional conflict".
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Figure 1 Predator (UAV) Capabilities
The Predator is a fully autonomous, low cost/ attritable, and interoperable with the current architecture. The design has achieved an air vehicle fly away cost of less than $4 million. The
Predator has near-term ISR capability. The system provides continuous, near all-weather day/night coverage with installed EO/IR and SAR sensors. 6 EO or electro-optical imaging produces a digitized image used for feature recognition and target identification. Basically a sophisticated camera, the digital representation can be enhanced far beyond typical photography and uses high-powered optics for extended ranges. IR or Infrared imaging can detect hotspots such as motor vehicles engines, jet engines, or missile exhaust. They have good location accuracy and are not subject to false targets such as sun reflectors. Infrared imagery can have a longer range than image intensifiers and can operate without starlight. IR capabilities are reduced in regions of high humidity. SAR stands for synthetic aperture radar. SAR compares differences in Doppler shifts between a moving radar dish and a target to achieve resolution and is superior to IR for night and all-weather imaging.
With these capable intelligence gathering sensors on board combined with cueing from satellites and other airborne surveillance assets, the ability of this UAV to gather sensitive imagery intelligence to support military operations is greatly enhanced.
COMMUNICATION and CONTROL
Predator is Normally controlled via Line of Sight (LOS) using C-Band microwave weather, intelligence, and medical personnel complete a deployable "kit". Previous conversation with a Predator pilot indicated a typical ratio of two sensor operators to one pilot for an eight hour shift. Further, for ISR missions based from fields with organic weather, intelligence, and medical assets (personnel), the size of the deployable unit can be reduced.
Part 4 GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS FOR THEATER OPERATIONS Weather
The general operations area of the predator in Southern Command's AOR is near the equator. Weather in this region can vary considerably. The typical westerly trade winds north of the equator produce considerable convective activity year around with an active hurricane season from June to November. The fairly durable airframe of the Predator should be able to handle most conditions with restrictions on forecasted icing greater than "light" and turbulence greater than "moderate". In addition, the Predator has a crosswind limit of 16 knots for takeoff and landing. Ground operations are halted if winds are greater than 30 knots in any direction.
Weather minimums require 800 ft ceilings or better and visibility of 2 miles for takeoff and landings due to the inability of the Predator to divert.
These operational considerations seem restrictive however, as an experienced pilot having conducted operations in the Caribbean, I do not feel these wind conditions would adversely affect the mission success of Predator in an ISR role. During previous deployments flying from bases in Puerto Rico, Panama, and Honduras, typical weather of significance occurred in the vicinity of convective activity and was of short duration. Average windspeed during the day was usually no more than fifteen knots and dropped off dramatically at night. Operations conducted during periods of adverse weather would be precluded for aircraft safety or could be augmented by extra P-3 sorties as dictated by mission parameters.
The effect of headwinds on operating capability needs to be addressed. Assuming a track into and then downwind, over time the search area covered will be the same. The difference will be in the time required to revisit or track back into the wind. Given the average cruise speed of Predator (120km/hr) 1 this should not have a detrimental affect on a search and track mission. Even traveling upwind, a fast target of interest (TOI) with a speed over the ground (SOG) of 60 Kts is within the ability of the Predator to keep up. However, the ability to pursue other TOI's and revisit a speedy TOI will be lost without a greater fuel burn rate that would affect endurance. Overall this should not be considered significant based upon the extended loiter times of Predator.
Airspace
Airspace coordination difficulties between the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) and the International Civilian Aircraft Organization (ICAO) agencies has been previously overcome through IFR flight plans, reserved block airspace, installed VHF /UHF radios, letters of agreement, and FAA flight following. Predator operations in the vicinity of foreign countries would be capable of maintaining required sovereign standoffs. Specific mission profiles will be discussed further in follow-on sections of this paper.
Notes
Part 5 PREDATOR EMPLOYMENT (GOING SOLO)
The Predator UAV can be employed as the primary Intelligence, Surveillance, and This operation was extremely successful in the apprehension of many illegal aliens attempting to cross the California border. Further, significant quantities of illegal narcotics were seized. 
PREVIOUS UAV EXPERIENCES IN COUNTER NARCOTICS/SMUGGLING OPS
Notes
Part 7
PREDATOR OPERATIONS UNDER P-3 CONTROL
The command and control requirements of the Navy's Predator Tactical Control Station (TCS) or its current equivalent would fit nicely inside the P-3 Orion. Installation would be facilitated via temporary mounting racks located in the main cabin area. Weight considerations and effects on aircraft center of gravity (CG) are unknown by the author, however suitable adjustments should be fairly easy to coordinate. Typical P-3 operations in the patrol mode use only the majority of the crew directly. Two sensor operators are available to take operational command of the UAV in this role. With crew augmentation by qualified Navy Predator pilots and extra sensor operators embarked, the P-3C Orion could serve as a mobile UAV control station. Interestingly, Predator has been previously controlled by submarine. 1 The proven ability to transfer command of the Navy Predator between ground and mobile controlling stations would allow one minimally manned ground station to control the UAV during the terminal ascent and descent phases and OPCON the UAV to the P-3 Orion when onstation. This mission role has two major advantages.
First, the uniquely capable APS -134 Inverse Synthetic Aperture Radar used by the P-3 has the ability to locate surface radar contacts in excess of 150 miles away. Typically, a P-3 in a patrol or surface surveillance mode will examine a block of ocean surface identifying each target through electronic, infrared, or visual means. Using these methods small targets such as low profile vessels or other vessels with a small radar return will be, either missed by the radar as a result of surface clutter, confirmed as suspect or otherwise, or unidentifiable which requires visual confirmation as to their origin. The predator UAV has the sensor capability to take queuing from the P-3 to localize and covertly track the target of interest. The endurance of the Predator UAV allows covert tracking to continue even during P-3 turnover to a relieving asset.
Further, by covertly tracking a target of interest while remaining relatively immune to endurance limitations, the Predator facilitates Coast Guard or Customs intercept to achieve endgame results.
Second, a P-3 Orion aircraft operating alone with questionable information regarding a target of interest (TOI) will visually confirmation the suspect vessel by low altitude over-flight or infrared illumination at a greatly reduced range. In either case, covertness is usually compromised and the suspect vessel will immediately jettison whatever contraband cargo is aboard. While this is a victory in the short term, covert tracking to produce end game confiscation and the accompanying arrest of all participants is lost using the P-3 Orion alone.
Predator is the answer.
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Part 8
CONCLUSION-PAINFUL REALITIES
Currently, the Pentagon's UAV budget is small ($620 million in 1999). 1 The ability of DoD to field sufficient number of operable UAV systems to meet the demands of the theater and battlefield commanders has been marginal at best. The full scale commitment to a "fleet" of UAV systems has not received the level of funding necessary to facilitate the advantages outlined in this paper. Heated battles over the ownership and control of UAVs continue unabated. The Airforce argues it should maintain control of all UAVs in order to maintain the integrity of the Air Tasking Order (ATO) and to prevent inadvertent downing of UAVs by friendly fire. The Army, increasingly views the 'deep battle' as its responsibility and wants UAV control to facilitate "maneuver warfare" with emphasis on the Shadow tactical UAV as its platform of choice. The Navy is concerned with UAVs that are shipboard or tilt rotor capable to operate within a confined deckspace.
A single UAV system developed for multiple service requirements has the advantage of reducing redundant development efforts that invariably occur when services try to field their own systems. Problems occur when each service has technical or mission requirements that make the Joint UAV unworkable or just too expensive. So far, the problems have been much greater than the solutions. Further, "when demand for UAVs outstrips their availability-as has often been the case -the needs of the tactical commanders may be sacrificed to those of higher echelons."
Joint Vision 2010 embraces the revolution in military affairs and weighs heavily on the side of technology and information superiority. As a up and coming darling of the revolution, UAV systems and continued UAV development should be given a dramatically larger piece of the budget pie. Options for UAV development as outlined in DoD publications needs to be acted upon decisively one way or another. Limits on design mission creep must be imposed to move a viable system to production more quickly. Until DoD decides upon a far-sighted course of action for future systems funding, the meager UAV assets available to the battlefield commander at the tactical or operational level of war will be wholly inadequate. Concept of UAV operations like the one outlined in this paper may never be pursued due to asset allocation and prioritization.
That is the painful reality for the operational commander.
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